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This is an appeal filed under the formal procedure pursuant 
to G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. c. 62C, § 39, from the refusal of 
the Commissioner of Revenue (“Commissioner”) to grant an 
abatement and refund of sales tax on telecommunications services 
to New Cingular Wireless PCS LLC (“New Cingular” or “Appellant”) 
for the tax periods November 2005 through September 2010 (“tax 
periods at issue”). 
Commissioner Scharaffa heard the appeal and was joined by 
Chairman Hammond and Commissioners Rose, Chmielinski, and Good 
in the decision for the Appellant. 
These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to 
requests by the Appellant and the Commissioner under 
G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32. 
 
Kathleen King Parker, Esq. and Margaret C. Wilson, Esq. for 
the Appellant. 
 
Frances M. Donovan, Esq., Marikae G. Toye, Esq., Timothy R. 
Stille, Esq., and Jamie E. Szal, Esq. for the Commissioner. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT 
On the basis of the record in its entirety, including 
testimony, a stipulation of agreed facts and exhibits, and trial 
exhibits, the Appellate Tax Board (“Board”) made the following 
findings of fact: 
I. Introduction 
During the tax periods at issue, the Appellant was an AT&T 
Mobility, LLC (“AT&T”) affiliate and conducted AT&T’s mobile 
wireless business in Massachusetts.
1
 The Appellant sold three 
primary lines of services — voice, text messaging, and data. The 
Appellant collected and remitted sales tax for these services 
and reported them as taxable telecommunications services in 
Massachusetts for the tax periods at issue.  
II. Issues and the Parties’ Contentions 
The federal Internet Tax Freedom Act (“ITFA” or “Act”), 
codified as a note to 47 U.S.C. § 151,
2
 generally precludes the 
taxing of Internet access by any state or political subdivision 
unless such tax falls within a grandfather clause or upon the 
failure to meet certain requisites, namely the accounting rule 
                                                     
1
 The Appellant used AT&T billing systems and services, and AT&T was the named 
party in a class action settlement agreement, as discussed, infra. 
Accordingly, these findings of fact and report reference either the Appellant 
or AT&T as the context so requires.  
2
 Initially, this moratorium was to end three years after the date of 
enactment of the ITFA on October 21, 1998. It was repeatedly extended by 
subsequent legislation and made permanent on February 24, 2016. See P.L. 114-
125.  
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and screening software provisions of the ITFA. See ITFA §§ 1101 
and 1106.  
At issue in this matter is whether the Appellant improperly 
collected and remitted Massachusetts sales tax on charges for 
data services (“charges at issue”) in contravention of the ITFA. 
To reach this ultimate issue, the Board considered several 
subsidiary issues: whether Massachusetts generally imposed and 
actually enforced a tax on Internet access prior to October 1, 
1998; whether the charges at issue constituted charges for 
Internet access; and, even if the charges at issue were charges 
for Internet access, whether the accounting rule and screening 
software provisions of the ITFA nonetheless permitted taxation 
of the charges at issue. The Board also considered whether an 
escrow mechanism instituted as part of a class action settlement 
sufficiently evidenced that the Appellant would provide a refund 
to any customer
3
 who incurred sales tax on the charges at issue, 
as required under G.L. c. 62C, § 37 and 830 CMR 62C.37.1.      
The testimony and exhibits submitted, in the Appellant’s 
view, were adequate to meet its burden of proof in establishing 
that the charges at issue were charges for Internet access and, 
therefore, exempted from taxation by the ITFA. The Appellant 
contended that it satisfied the ITFA’s accounting rule provision 
by demonstrating that the charges at issue were separately 
                                                     
3
 Excluding any customers who decided to opt out of the class action 
settlement, as explained, infra.  
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stated on customer invoices and its internal books and records. 
The Appellant refuted the applicability of the ITFA’s screening 
software provision, specifically alleging: (1) that the 
screening software provision applies only to a tax imposed on an 
Internet access provider, and here the Massachusetts sales tax 
is imposed on buyers rather than providers; and (2) that the 
definition of “Internet access provider” contained in the 
screening software provision does not apply to the Appellant. 
Nonetheless, the Appellant asserted compliance with the 
screening software provision by its offering of relevant 
screening software to customers at the time that they had 
entered into an agreement for Internet access during the tax 
periods at issue. The Appellant also contended that the escrow 
mechanism ensured that refunds would be issued to customers who 
had paid sales tax on the charges at issue.    
The Commissioner challenged whether the charges at issue 
comprised charges solely for Internet access or whether the 
charges at issue comprised an indistinguishable amalgam of 
charges for Internet access and taxable non-Internet access, all 
falling under the umbrella of data services. The Commissioner 
contended that the term “data services” is not synonymous with 
Internet access and, therefore, the charges at issue represent 
taxable telecommunications services pursuant to G.L. c. 64H, 
§§ 1 and 2, 830 CMR 64H.1.6, and Technical Information Release 
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05-8: Taxation of Internet Access, Electronic Commerce and 
Telecommunications Services: Recent Federal Legislation. The 
Commissioner disputed the Appellant’s compliance with the ITFA’s 
accounting rule and screening software provisions, and 
consequently disputed whether the Appellant was entitled to 
exemption from Massachusetts sales tax by the ITFA. The 
Commissioner also rejected the escrow mechanism as evidence of 
repayment, alleging that the various counsel expenses and fees 
that would be deducted from customers’ refunds pursuant to the 
class action settlement are not permissible in meeting the 
repayment requisite under G.L. c. 62C, § 37 and 830 CMR 
62C.37.1. The Commissioner also noted that the settlement was a 
private transaction to which the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
was not a party.  
III. Procedural History 
The Appellant remitted Massachusetts sales tax that was 
imposed upon the charges at issue and paid by its Massachusetts 
customers. It filed a Sales and Use Tax on Telecommunications 
Services Return with the Commissioner for each of the tax 
periods at issue and reported the charges at issue as 
telecommunications services subject to the Massachusetts sales 
tax. Thereafter, the Appellant filed a Form CA-6: Application 
for Abatement/Amended Return (“Application for Abatement”) for 
the tax periods at issue on November 15, 2010, seeking an 
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abatement and refund of the sales tax (“Massachusetts Abatement 
and Refund Claim”).4  
The Commissioner’s Office of Appeals conducted a hearing on 
the Application for Abatement on February 5, 2012. By letter 
dated June 24, 2013, the Office of Appeals determined that the 
Application for Abatement should be denied. By Notices of 
Abatement Determination issued July 3, 2013, the Commissioner 
denied the Application for Abatement for the tax periods at 
issue. The Appellant filed a Petition Under Formal Procedure 
with the Board on August 29, 2013. On the basis of these facts, 
the Board found and ruled that it had jurisdiction over this 
appeal.   
By Order dated April 8, 2015, the Board bifurcated this 
matter into two phases: a hearing to determine whether the 
charges at issue were taxable (“Phase I”) and a hearing to 
determine the amount of the abatement and refund if the charges 
at issue were not taxable (“Phase II”).  
The hearing on Phase I took place over the course of five 
days, from April 6-10, 2015. By Order dated October 21, 2016, 
the Board ruled that the charges at issue in this appeal were 
not taxable.
5
  
                                                     
4
 The Appellant and the Commissioner executed consents extending the time for 
assessment, which also extended the statute of limitations with respect to 
abatement claims. See G.L. c. 62C, § 37.  
5
 The parties filed various dispositive motions, which were either denied by 
the Board or withdrawn.  
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On November 4, 2016, the Board ordered that the hearing on 
Phase II — to determine the amount of the abatement — would be 
held on March 28, 2017. 
On February 10, 2017, the Appellant and the Commissioner 
filed a Joint Motion requesting that the Board allow their 
“Stipulation of Agreed Facts and Documents Phase II” to be 
admitted into evidence. The Board allowed the Joint Motion by 
Order dated February 17, 2017. Item No. 24 of the “Stipulation 
of Agreed Facts and Documents Phase II” stated as follows: “The 
parties hereby stipulate and agree that the amount of the claim 
at issue is $19,938,368, and the requirements of G.L. c. 62C, 
§ 40 having been satisfied on January 5, 2017, interest shall 
begin to accrue on that date.”  
Also by Order dated February 17, 2017, the Board noted that 
the Appellant and the Commissioner had not waived the March 28, 
2017 hearing on Phase II. The Board gave the Appellant and the 
Commissioner seven days to file either: “(1) a statement 
concerning the issues to be resolved at the March 28, 2017 
hearing; or, (2) a waiver of the March 28, 2017 hearing and any 
further hearing on the merits and a request to submit the appeal 
to the Board for decision on the evidence currently in the 
record.” 
On February 22, 2017, the Appellant and the Commissioner 
filed a joint document entitled “Phase II — Submission Without 
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Oral Argument or Further Hearing,” which stated as follows: The 
Appellant and the Commissioner, “pursuant to Rule 31 of the 
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Board, hereby agree for 
the purposes of Phase II of this case to rely on the Stipulation 
of Facts and Documents filed with the Board on February 10, 2017 
and allowed by Order of the Board dated February 17, 2017.”  
On March 3, 2017, the Board issued its Decision for the 
Appellant with an abatement in the agreed-upon amount of 
$19,938,368, plus statutory additions.  
IV. Testimony and Documentary Evidence 
A. The Class Action Settlement 
As testified to by Edward D. Robertson, Jr., a former Chief 
Justice of the Missouri Supreme Court, he and his law firm 
partners detected a billing variance when comparing their Sprint 
and AT&T bills. They attributed the anomaly to AT&T having 
imposed state sales tax on charges for Internet access whereas 
Sprint did not. Mr. Robertson testified about an AT&T customer 
invoice received by his law firm in which a charge for data 
services included a corresponding charge for Kansas sales tax, 
while a Sprint customer invoice received by his law firm for 
data services on a data card did not include a corresponding 
charge for such tax. According to Mr. Robertson’s understanding, 
data services equate with the ability to access the Internet. 
Mr. Robertson was personally familiar with AT&T’s data services 
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as his law firm was a customer and he personally used the data 
services to access the Internet and email.  
Thereafter, Mr. Robertson’s law firm and law firms in 
various states filed lawsuits against AT&T (including the 
Appellant as a subsidiary of AT&T) on behalf of AT&T customers 
across the country,
6
 alleging that AT&T had wrongly collected 
sales tax on charges for Internet access in violation of state 
tax laws and the ITFA. The lawsuits were consolidated into a 
class action in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, with Mr. Robertson appointed as 
Class Counsel.
7
 Subsequently, the class action was resolved with 
a settlement agreement,
8
 which included Massachusetts customers, 
with the exception of four Massachusetts customers who had opted 
out of the settlement. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts was not 
a party to the settlement agreement.  
Mr. Robertson testified that notice to impacted individuals 
was provided by a variety of means, including postcard, email, 
and text message, as well as a notice published in USA Today. 
                                                     
6
 A Massachusetts claim was filed in the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts under Rock v. AT&T Mobility, LLC. 
7
 “On August 11, 2010, the Court granted in large part the parties’ joint 
motion for class certification, preliminary approval of class settlement, 
approval of notice, and appointment of notice administrator.” In re AT&T 
Mobility Wireless Data Servs. Sales Tax Litig., 789 F. Supp. 2d 935, 939 (N. 
D. Ill., E. Div., 2011).  
8
 The settlement agreement was entered into “between and among AT&T Mobility 
LLC . . . and the Class Plaintiffs.” Paragraph 1.2 of the settlement 
agreement defined the term “AT&T Mobility LLC” as “AT&T Mobility LLC, AT&T 
Inc. and all of their predecessors in interest, successors in interest and 
any of their parents, subsidiaries, divisions or affiliates . . . . This 
shall include but not be limited to the list of affiliates attached as 
Exhibit A.” Exhibit A included New Cingular Wireless PCS LLC. 
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The record included an exhibit of the notice language. According 
to Mr. Robertson and documentation in the record, a website was 
also created that provided information on the class action and 
settlement.  
Mr. Robertson was involved in negotiating the settlement 
agreement and was a signatory on the settlement agreement as 
Interim Settlement Class Counsel. The United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois approved the 
settlement agreement and an attendant escrow agreement and plan 
of distribution. The Court’s decision “determines how the money 
is going to be distributed,” noted Mr. Robertson. “It does not 
determine how much or whether the money is owed.”  
While it denied any liability as a term of the settlement 
agreement, AT&T agreed to stop collecting and remitting tax on 
charges for Internet access.
9
 AT&T also agreed to process and 
assist in abatement and refund claims nationwide, including the 
Massachusetts Abatement and Refund Claim.
10
 
                                                     
9
 In the settlement agreement, AT&T reserved the right to resume collection 
and remittance if “federal, state or local laws, statutes, regulations, 
administrative decisions or pronouncements, or the interpretation of any of 
the foregoing specifically requires, authorizes or permits the collection and 
payment of” such taxes. 
10
 In Massachusetts, vendors must seek a refund of sales tax on behalf of 
purchasers. See WorldWide TechServices, LLC v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
479 Mass. 20, 29 (2018) (“Vendors are responsible for collecting and 
remitting the sales tax and therefore are the party entitled to seek 
abatement.”) (citing G.L. c. 64H, § 3; First Agricultural Nat’l Bank of 
Berkshire County v. State Tax Comm’n, 353 Mass. 172, 179 (1967), rev’d on 
other grounds, 392 U.S. 339 (1968)). But see Technical Information Release 
16-12: Purchasers Seeking a Refund of Sales/Use Tax under Power of Attorney 
from Vendor.  
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The settlement agreement, escrow agreement, and plan of 
distribution outlined the escrow mechanism for the deposit and 
disbursement of any amounts refunded by states — any such funds 
are held by an independent third party until distribution of the 
funds. Mr. Robertson testified that the escrow mechanism was 
described in information provided to impacted individuals before 
the deadline for opting out of the settlement.  
A master escrow account was created to receive all refund 
payments, with subaccounts segregated for separate taxing 
jurisdictions such as Massachusetts (master escrow account and 
subaccounts collectively “escrow account”). As testified to by 
Mr. Robertson, if there is a refund, “AT&T doesn’t get to keep a 
dime of this money. It all goes into these escrow accounts and 
ultimately to be paid out to the customers.”11 He stated that 
“[s]ometimes the taxing jurisdiction will write a check directly 
into the escrow account. When that happens, we then distribute 
it according to the settlement agreement.”  
If a taxing jurisdiction issues a refund directly to AT&T 
instead of to the escrow account, AT&T is required to transfer 
the funds to the escrow account within seven business days. If 
the taxing jurisdiction issues only a credit instead of a 
monetary refund, Mr. Robertson explained that “AT&T funds the 
                                                     
11
 According to Mr. Robertson, “What happens at the end of the day, we’ve sent 
out money in a lot of these states. And there are checks that don’t get 
cashed and those go under whatever unclaimed property laws are for that 
jurisdiction.”  
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escrow and then takes [a] credit against ongoing taxes going 
forward.” Mr. Robertson testified that when cash goes into an 
escrow account “[t]hat’s ultimately the federal court [that] 
supervises it. The management of it is a company in Washington, 
DC.” He identified the company as Analysis Research Planning 
Corporation. 
The plan of distribution outlined the disbursement of funds 
to impacted individuals as follows: “Unless otherwise ordered by 
the Court, each Settlement Class Member shall receive, on 
account of the Internet Taxes which that Settlement Class Member 
paid, a distribution in an amount equal to the Settlement Class 
Member’s pro rata share of the Refund Payments made by, or on 
behalf of, the Taxing Jurisdictions that received Internet Taxes 
from that Settlement Class Member less” various costs such as 
counsel fees and expenses, administration expenses, distribution 
expenses, and class representative expenses.  
B. The Refund Claims for Data Services    
Scott Adams, the Director of Tax for AT&T Services,
12
 
testified that “approximately 1,000 refund claims” were filed 
across the country and “the responsibility was handed to me to 
coordinate the reviews that would come as a result of filing the 
claims.” Mr. Adams was not involved in putting together the 
Massachusetts Abatement and Refund Claim itself, but was 
                                                     
12
 Mr. Adams explained that “AT&T Services is the administrative arm for the 
AT&T companies, of which one of them is New Cingular Wireless.” 
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involved in the subsequent review of the Massachusetts Abatement 
and Refund Claim. He stated that “[f]rom a high level, I was 
part of the team that was working through these claims and 
overseeing that they were completed in a timely manner and all 
the information was provided to the auditors.”  
Mr. Adams testified that his position requires an 
understanding of and regular dealings with AT&T’s customer 
invoicing practices, tax computation systems, billing records, 
electronic systems, and transaction tax reporting and compliance 
procedures. He performs his employment services in part for the 
Appellant and in his position, “I oversee the completion of 
audits and refund reviews that are conducted for transaction 
taxes, sales and use tax, [and] gross receipts tax.” The 
approximately fifteen employees that he supervises, including 
contractors, are each “an audit manager. Their job is to work 
with the jurisdictions, the auditors from the jurisdictions, to 
make sure that they have all the documentation they need to 
support an audit. Providing records, sales invoices, purchase 
invoices, all the different aspects of an audit.”  
Mr. Adams testified that the Appellant provides three 
primary services — voice, text messaging, and data — and that 
the Massachusetts Abatement and Refund Claim sought a refund 
solely for sales tax on charges for data services, the charges 
at issue. He explained that data services are Internet access 
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services and that it is standard in the communications industry 
to refer to Internet access as data: “The data is the industry’s 
term on how they’re presented to customers, [they] sign up for a 
data plan. But in my experience, data is a synonym for internet 
access.” He noted that the term “Internet access” is “not a term 
associated with the plans that are offered” and that “we didn’t 
get any say [in] how it was presented” or whether the plan 
description comported with references to Internet access in “the 
tax rules.” Mr. Adams stressed that “obviously in order for us 
to feel comfortable turning the tax off for 46 million customers 
. . . . we have to feel pretty comfortable that it is internet 
access. . . . and to explain to our bosses that the risk for 
AT&T is not there because we agree that the service we’re 
providing is not taxable.”  
Mr. Adams analogized the Appellant’s data services to “[a] 
pipe that can stream stuff to me and I can push stuff up. I can 
send e-mails. I can receive e-mails.” He stated that “[w]ith the 
exception of [voice and text messaging], anything that’s going 
to be downloading real time information, or going to individual 
servers, that’s all part of the data internet access.” He 
further explained that “we’re charging you for how much you pull 
across that pipe. . . . The content that’s being downloaded, the 
amount of content that you pull across is what we’re charging 
for.” He added that “[t]he reality is we don’t own ESPN.com. We 
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don’t own all these other apps. One of the most common videos is 
Netflix. We don’t own Netflix. We can’t sell movies, but we can 
give you access to the pipe so you can go to Netflix’s server 
and pull across movies and pull across TV shows.”  
Mr. Adams testified that the Massachusetts Abatement and 
Refund Claim was generated by way of AT&T’s proprietary billing 
systems, Care and Telegence, with Telegence being “more 
prevalent, the biggest biller we have.” “Both of them,” 
according to Mr. Adams, “were custom built for AT&T.” The 
Appellant’s transactions, including any transactions underlying 
the charges at issue, were captured and processed in these 
systems. He explained that Care and Telegence “contained all of 
the service revenue” upon which taxes were billed and “[s]o, 
those two systems that we maintain and store the detail in, were 
queried in order to come up with how much tax we over-
collected.”  
Primarily focusing on the Telegence system, Mr. Adams 
described the level of detail that the system is capable of 
capturing: “It gets down all the way to the specific item that’s 
being purchased.” Using a $30 iPhone plan as an example, he 
stated that “[t]he system goes in there for that $30 iPhone data 
plan. The $30 charge that we looked at. The system will go in 
and look at where the charge takes place, the place of primary 
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use
13
 for that charge, determine is it taxable in that location. 
And then if it is, it has to go through all of the different 
taxes; state tax, city tax, county tax, federal taxes, and make 
assessments or come up with amounts for all the various taxes 
for that individual line item on that invoice.” He added that 
“inside of the Telegence system, all of that very detailed line 
item information is stored. And that was what was pulled 
together for this claim.”14 
All customers are assigned billing account numbers, 
according to Mr. Adams: “Corporate, individual, everyone has a 
billing account number and basically it determines [who is] 
going to be invoiced for the various phone numbers that fall 
underneath that billing account number.”15 He added that “[t]his 
is who paid the tax. This [identifies] who would the checks be 
written to if the abatement was approved.” Customers are 
inducted into the billing system when they sign up for a plan 
either in-store, online, or via telephone. “[T]hey can purchase 
a device if they didn’t have their own device and as soon as 
they agree to which plan they want, we take down all their 
                                                     
13
 Mr. Adams stressed the importance of the place of primary use in charging 
the correct state and local tax: “[E]very time a customer signs up for an 
account[,] a phone number if you will, they have to tell us where they’re 
going to use the device. They have to indicate a place of primary use. And 
once they commit that to us, we enter that into the system and that will be 
the location where each phone number is charged the appropriate taxes.” 
14
 While Mr. Adams has the ability to access individual records in the system, 
programmers and IT personnel assisted in querying the system to put larger 
bundles of information into an auditor-friendly format.      
15
 A single billing account number can have multiple assigned telephone 
numbers.  
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information and primary place of use as a key element,” 
testified Mr. Adams. He stated that “all that information would 
be fed into [Telegence], our main biller, for the monthly 
service revenue.”  
Mr. Adams explained that billing codes “are really an 
internal coding that happens when a customer selects a plan.” He 
became “intimately familiar with billing codes” as a result of 
the refund claims filed throughout the country. He personally 
examined upwards of 10,000 to 15,000 invoices containing 5,000 
to 6,000 different billing codes in his review of the many 
refund claims filed nationwide. Billing codes are not specific 
to states, according to Mr. Adams. “We don’t have a 
Massachusetts set of bill codes and Texas set of bill codes,” he 
stated.  
Up to 99 percent of the billing codes “deal with the three 
revenue sources I talked about before, voice, texting, and 
data,” according to Mr. Adams. In addition to identifying refund 
claims, billing codes were used to identify sales tax on the 
charges at issue, which the Appellant has stopped collecting and 
remitting pursuant to the settlement agreement.
16
 Mr. Adams 
explained that billing codes comprise two components, a feature 
code and a service order code (“SOC”) code, with the SOC code 
providing “more of the detail” of a specific plan. Documentation 
                                                     
16
 See footnote 9, supra. 
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in the record — prepared by a member of Mr. Adams’ team using 
the Telegence system as the source — provided a breakdown of the 
codes underlying the Massachusetts Abatement and Refund Claim 
and indicated that the top twenty SOC codes accounted for 78 
percent of the Massachusetts Abatement and Refund Claim, with 
iPhone and Blackberry data plans accounting for the majority.  
Mr. Adams noted that SOC codes are standard across 
customers, i.e., if a charge related to a particular SOC code is 
on one customer’s bill, it will be exactly the same on another 
customer’s bill: “It’s a standard code, what’s put on the 
invoice is exactly the same and the same price. You’re not going 
to have IPN1 and I’m charged 20 and you’re charged 30.” He added 
that “there’s a lot contained in that code but the good thing is 
it’s very standardized. Every time we see IPN1, it’s the same 
thing. So, if I have 10 million IPN1s in this claim, they’re all 
going to look the same, contain the same identical 
characteristics, same services being offered, all those 
different things.” Though the tax department provides input on 
the taxability of an SOC code “because each one has to be marked 
whether they’re taxable or not taxable,” Mr. Adams testified 
that the assigning of an SOC code to a product is a function of 
the marketing department. 
During the tax periods at issue, Mr. Adams stated that 
65,000 billing codes were in use, which “were reviewed with the 
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help of our billing group [and] marketing team, it was a big 
undertaking.” Some billing codes represented bundled service 
plans, meaning such plans included “two of the three main 
revenue streams, voice, texting and data,” according to 
Mr. Adams. He testified that bundled service codes were not 
included in the refund claims. “We reviewed to determine which 
of those plans were data and the result was about 14,000 bill 
codes
17
 nationwide that were identified as data only,” he stated. 
When subsequent reviews revealed that refund claims filed 
nationwide had incorporated certain billing codes in error, 
Mr. Adams noted that a letter was sent to any impacted tax 
jurisdictions, including Massachusetts, amending the amount of 
refund requested to reflect a reduction based upon the removal 
of any tax charges associated with these billing codes.    
Mr. Adams cautioned that the word “BUN” in a billing code 
did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the code 
represented a bundling of more than one service. Mr. Adams 
explained that the billing codes are “our marketing description” 
but the codes do not always mean a bundling of “the three 
buckets of revenue [voice, data services, and text messaging] 
we’ve talked about.” He further explained that when the 
                                                     
17
 When asked whether some of these codes were immaterial to the Massachusetts 
Abatement and Refund Claim in particular, Mr. Adams testified that “probably 
12,000, 13,000. The majority of those claims are one time little plans that 
we had at one point” and that “the vast majority of the dollars nationwide 
are only made up in a very small handful, less than 50 claims I can say 
safely nationwide, make up 95 percent of the dollars.” 
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marketing department is “trying to decide how to sell a customer 
on a service . . . they’ll call it a media bundle. And if I’m a 
consumer, what does that mean? It means . . . you can do this 
with this. You can access Safari. So it’s a variety of media 
that you can access through this data plan.” He added that 
“[w]hat they don’t realize is the technology that’s behind 
getting them all that content is all the same. It’s all going 
out to a server, retrieving information and pulling it back down 
to them. So in marketing we may tell them it’s a media bundle. 
But in reality, what are we really providing? Access to the 
internet. That’s really what it is.”  
To illustrate his point, Mr. Adams provided a breakdown of 
an invoice for a customer with a “BUN” code, noting the itemized 
charge for data services versus other charges for text messaging 
and voice. “The bundle doesn’t materialize in the invoice,” 
Mr. Adams stated. “It’s not a bundle of the three services that 
we talked about.” Mr. Adams became aware of such “BUN” codes 
“[t]hrough our reviews. As I mentioned, tens of thousands of 
invoices that we’ve sat down and gone through. And it’s the same 
process to review whether bundled or not.”  
Mr. Adams’ “focus has been with the marketing team to sit 
down and say, what can you do with the data plan. And as you go 
down the list of things you can do with a data plan, they’re all 
accessed through servers that are located on this thing we call 
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the internet.” He added that “all these different services and 
the Yahoo accounts and the gmail accounts and the Google 
accounts. Those aren’t ours. They’re not sitting on our servers. 
Those are on outside servers that they access through the 
internet.” 
Mr. Adams also testified to numerous customer invoices 
pertaining to the Massachusetts Abatement and Refund Claim and 
corresponding spreadsheets detailing which itemized line items 
on the invoices matched with the specific charges at issue. 
Mr. Adams noted how the description for data services on a 
customer invoice matched with a proprietary SOC code on the 
spreadsheet — for instance, an SOC code of PDVU18 translated to 
PDACnctUntlAdd (PDA connect unlimited add on) on a customer 
invoice: “So, every time on our side we see PDVU, on the 
customer side they’re going to see PDA [connect] unlimited add 
on and it’s going to be 39.99, so, that’s important so you don’t 
have to look at a million of these to know that PDA is going to 
be the same in each case.”  
According to Mr. Adams, any services on the customer 
invoices other than stand-alone data services were not included 
in the Massachusetts Abatement and Refund Claim, such as voice, 
text messaging, bundled services, and the right to download 
software. Mr. Adams identified charges for Ms. PAC-MAN and PAC-
                                                     
18
 PDVU was one of the top twenty SOC codes accounting for 78 percent of the 
Massachusetts Abatement and Refund Claim, as discussed, supra. 
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MAN, for example, on an invoice. These charges were not included 
on the corresponding spreadsheet detailing the invoice charges 
included in the Massachusetts Abatement and Refund Claim. He 
explained that such charges were “payment for the content” and 
“independent of the internet access itself.”  
Mr. Adams emphasized that the various invoices and 
spreadsheets showed that tax was initially collected on these 
line items comprising the Massachusetts Abatement and Refund 
Claim. His confidence in these assertions comes from “the 
confidence in the system first. And the fact that we generate 
millions of records per day from our Telegence biller for every 
state plus international as well. So we have a very robust 
system in place to capture all this information.”  
Mr. Adams also emphasized his experience with “the audit 
side. Having been through so many reviews and reviewed so many 
lines of details, tens of thousands of lines of details on 
spreadsheets, looking at actual invoices to see what customers 
are being billed for, what they’re receiving in exchange for 
their payments, extensive reviews.” 
Mr. Adams noted that twenty-four other states have already 
paid the refund claims on this same issue, determining that 
charges equivalent to the charges at issue were charges for 
Internet access and that the charges were separately stated on 
the company’s books and records.        
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C. Screening Software 
Though the Appellant contended that the screening software 
provision of the ITFA was inapplicable in this matter, it 
nonetheless provided testimony and documentation to establish 
compliance, including testimony from Kristen Leatherberry. 
Ms. Leatherberry was hired on May 8, 2006 as a Senior Marketing 
Manager
19
 and testified that she is “responsible for customer 
facing and communications to . . . employees and customers.” She 
explained that customer facing “means any brochures, web sites, 
any kind of collateral, communications to customers.” She stated 
that to develop a brochure, “I create all the copy and provide 
the assets, whether that be images or icons, value propositions, 
key benefits for the products and I write all the copy and then 
I give it to the marketing communications group or to AT&T.com 
or at that point it was Cingular.com and they create the 
material, it comes back to us.” She added that “[w]e review it 
and proof it and then get leadership and legal approval and 
marketing communication goes ahead and prints it and distributes 
it.” 
Ms. Leatherberry described the Appellant’s Parental 
Controls feature as “a tool that helps parents manage their 
kids’ phone use.” Though she was not involved in the 
functionality of Parental Controls in terms of how the feature 
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 Ms. Leatherberry noted that, upon her initial employment, the company was 
called Cingular Wireless and subsequently became AT&T. 
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operated in a technical sense, she participated in the 
informational side of communicating the feature to customers, 
including responsibility for language content in brochures and a 
website. Ms. Leatherberry testified to numerous documents in 
existence during the tax periods at issue that provided 
customers with detail and instructions on Parental Controls. 
Though some documents — such as a brochure with a copyright 
of 2005 entitled “With Cingular Parental Controls, know your 
kids are safe and avoid surprises” — preceded Ms. Leatherberry’s 
employment, she maintained such documents as part of the normal 
course of her position. This particular 2005 brochure explained 
that with Parental Controls, a consumer could “[r]estrict access 
to websites containing mature content that is not appropriate 
for children” and “[r]estrict purchase of downloads such as 
games, ringtones and graphics.” Other brochures and website 
pages in the record noted that a compatible handset was required 
for utilization of this feature. Similarly, a website extract 
described the Appellant’s Smart Limits choice as a feature that 
“[r]estrict[s] access to content inappropriate for children,” in 
addition to other controls. The Parental Controls feature was 
listed as no additional charge, while the Smart Limits feature 
was listed as costing $4.99 per month, per line. 
Ms. Leatherberry also testified to various website pages, 
bill inserts, box inserts, mailings sent after the purchase of a 
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new phone, and in-store brochures, all of which informed parents 
how to set up the Appellant’s Parental Controls and Smart Limits 
features and restrict access to the Internet. Ms. Leatherberry 
noted that AT&T was the exclusive carrier of the iPhone during 
relevant time periods, and the record contained an iPhone User 
Guide
20
 with a copyright of 2009, explaining how to restrict 
various applications and content. 
D. The Commissioner’s Expert Witness 
The Commissioner presented the testimony of Mehran Nazari, 
a licensed engineer “in the field of electrical computing, 
computer and electronics” who is the Founder, President, and 
Managing Director of AdGen Telecom Group, an entity that 
provides “consulting services in the field of technology, 
wireless, and network design.” Mr. Nazari testified that his 
consulting services encompass “[w]ireless network design, 
including voice and data. Program and project management.” 
Additionally, his services include “[p]roviding voice and data, 
program and project management for network implementation, 
strategy, planning, spectrum acquisition, [and] network overlay 
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 The iPhone User Guide contained a section on “Restrictions,” which stated 
as follows: “You can set restrictions for the use of some applications and 
for iPod content on iPhone. For example, parents can restrict explicit music 
from being seen on playlists, or turn off YouTube access entirely.” The 
iPhone Safari application, which “lets you surf the web and view webpages on 
iPhone in the same way as if you were on your computer,” was one such 
application capable of restrictions as detailed in the iPhone User Guide: 
“Safari is disabled and its icon removed from the Home screen. You cannot use 
Safari to browse the web or access web clips. Other third-party applications 
may allow web browsing even if Safari is disabled.”   
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implementation.” He also advises clients on cellular technology. 
Mr. Nazari explained that “cellular mobile technology has 
evolved from [] pure voice to [] data and broadband services. 
So, everything having to do with the network has been evolving 
ever since I got into this business back in 1982.” 
His purpose in being retained by the Commissioner for this 
matter was to provide a basic understanding of wireless 
technology, including the implementation of various services 
into a carrier’s network, as well as the tracking of these 
services in the carrier’s network and billing.21 “Each of those 
services are handled through [] specific equipment, as we call 
it, node on the network,” he stated. “And each node has [its] 
own identification that gets recorded into the billing system 
for the carriers for post-processing and billing.” In the course 
of his preparation for this matter, he “reviewed some of the 
exhibits that [were] provided by AT&T throughout the course of 
the hearing. I reviewed a few invoices. And I had done some 
research on my own.”  
Mr. Nazari discussed at length the generalities of how a 
cellular network operates. In his opinion, all cellular networks 
operate “[s]ubstantially the same. They have used different 
technologies but they do adhere to the common standards.” He 
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 The hearing officer “allow[ed] him to testify as an expert in 
telecommunications technology. But with respect to billing practices, it will 
go to weight.” 
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explained that “at the basic level the carrier’s network 
consists of what we call the radio network . . . and a core 
network which is actually where the brain of the network is.” He 
further explained that “[t]he radio network consists of 
transmitter locations that are strategically located in a given 
area to provide the required coverage. And those radio 
network[s], otherwise called bay stations, interface with the 
core network[,] with a device[,] or a platform called base 
station subsystem which acts as a traffic cop.”  
According to Mr. Nazari, the base station subsystem 
determines whether a user originates a voice, text, or data 
service. He stated that “[t]he core network is basically 
responsible for customer provisioning, providing billing 
records, providing the interface to [an] outside network for 
call termination, [if] it’s a voice call. It houses the 
voicemail, the short messaging center, content server, 
multimedia server, and the packet switch.”  
In Mr. Nazari’s experience “carriers began to provide data 
services over their network to their subscribers [around 2003 to 
2004].” He noted that “[o]bviously, Cingular was using a 
different technology than Verizon.” He opined that carriers “had 
to add additional features to their network [to provide data 
services]. . . . And also, they had to make sure that their 
subscriber handsets [were] capable of providing [], or 
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accessing, the data side of the network. As well as making sure 
that the billing system is capable of providing or capturing the 
required information for the billing.” He testified that 
carriers, handset manufacturers, and infrastructure 
manufacturers all adhered to common standards because “[i]f that 
was not true, you would not have been able to make calls from 
your network, or your network provider, to somebody else’s 
network. Let’s say [an] AT&T customer could not have made calls 
to a Verizon subscriber. So they all have to adhere to the same 
standards, even small carriers.”22 
Mr. Nazari testified that carriers have the ability to bill 
a customer separately for services and that this technology is 
an integral part of the network design. “It’s integral,” he 
explained, “because if they can’t measure it, they can’t bill 
it. And if they can’t bill it, they don’t make enough money or 
revenue.” Mr. Nazari admitted that billing codes are not 
mandated or regulated by the Federal Communications Commission; 
that there are no federal or state regulations informing 
carriers how to create billing codes; that there are no limits 
on the number of billing codes a carrier can utilize; and that 
carriers each create their own sets of billing codes.  
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 Mr. Nazari identified “third generation partnership project” or 3GPP as “a 
body that develops, maintains, standards for various technologies that are 
used by mobile carriers throughout the world.” He testified that in 2005, the 
start of the tax periods at issue, “carriers were using 2.5 [generation] and 
they were moving toward the third generation.”  
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Mr. Nazari disputed that the Appellant’s data services were 
synonymous with Internet access. He testified that based on 
certain documents in evidence and services offered by the 
Appellant, he did not believe that the charges at issue were 
solely charges for Internet access. Though he admitted that he 
is not an expert on the ITFA, he stated that he is “an expert 
when it comes to defining what is considered internet. What is 
not considered to be internet.”23 His opinion is that data 
services are not the same as Internet access: “Data is not 
internet. Data includes other services that [are] not all 
internet.” He added that “[d]ata is a general term that’s used 
for anything describing [] transmission of bytes, however you 
want to call it, from one computer to another. That falls into 
internet and intranet
24
 and a few other data services that are 
also called data.” He testified that the terms “Internet” and 
“intranet” have standardized definitions, but that he wasn’t “in 
a position to tell you exactly where to go” to find those 
definitions.   
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 When asked what sources he relied upon for his standard of the term 
“Internet,” he stated “[e]very text book, every standard that’s written you 
could look at it and figure out what it is. If you want me to specifically 
mention it, I’d be happy to mention it. But I don’t know it off the top of my 
head what I should point you to exactly say that.” 
24
 Merriam-Webster defines “intranet” as “a network operating like the 
World Wide Web but having access restricted to a limited group of 
authorized users (such as employees of a company).” Intranet, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/intranet (last 
visited March 16, 2018). 
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Based upon his review of billing codes that the Appellant 
identified as codes solely representing Internet access, 
Mr. Nazari testified that he could not say for certain on their 
face whether this was true. As to whether any codes on their 
face appeared to be codes for bundled services, Mr. Nazari noted 
items with a “Feature Description” of “Media Bundle,” as well as 
items with a “Feature Description” of “VVM Media Bundle.”25 He 
admitted, however, that he has never examined AT&T’s billing 
practices, systems, and codes until this matter, and has never 
reviewed AT&T’s billing codes in consulting with other clients.26  
 Throughout his testimony, Mr. Nazari attempted to 
distinguish between content germane to a carrier’s network, such 
as a ringtone, game, or video only accessible on a carrier’s 
network to customers, versus content accessible outside a 
carrier’s network (intranet versus Internet access, in his 
opinion, both under the umbrella of data services): “If the 
subscriber is interested in some content[] that is provided 
                                                     
25
 As discussed, supra, Mr. Adams’ testimony contradicted Mr. Nazari’s 
interpretation of the billing codes, deflecting the notion that inclusion of 
the word “bundle” in a billing code necessarily leads to the conclusion that 
the code represents a charge for multiple services. 
26
 The Board rejected the Commissioner’s assertion that “Mr. Nazari has 
personal knowledge and an expert understanding of [the Appellant’s] billing 
systems and network during the relevant time period.” Mr. Nazari did testify 
that “there was a network that Cingular called AT&T Wireless and [] some of 
the network had to be divested.” He stated that a client of his purchased one 
of the networks and he was involved in managing “the entire build-out and the 
entire carving off [of] the network, which . . . included voice, data, 
billing, customer transition, everything having to do with taking that 
market, that network into a new network.” But when asked whether he looked at 
the old billing system as part of transitioning subscribers to a new billing 
system, his response was “[n]o.” 
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strictly by the carrier’s network, let’s say ring tone or games 
or video that is strictly, again, provided by one carrier, not 
over the internet, then that would be considered a data not 
internet; it would be considered intranet, and, yes, they can 
have access to that.” Mr. Nazari relied upon several documents 
for his assertion, such as a news release entitled “Cingular 
Goes Live With MobiTV,”27 which he found to be significant 
because “[i]t proves that Cingular was providing TV broadcasting 
over their network” to subscribers. He further explained that 
“[i]t provides the internet TV or IP TV over the data network, 
over this data network to the subscribers that intended to 
receive it.”  
He also relied upon an AT&T document concerning Internet 
Protocol television, citing the following language in the 
document as relevant to his opinion that data services provided 
by the Appellant comprised more than just Internet access: 
“Think of Internet Protocol as a ‘language’ that devices use to 
communicate over a computer network. IP is not the same thing as 
the Internet. Rather, it’s the same language used by the 
                                                     
27
 The news release stated in pertinent part as follow: “With MobiTV, Cingular 
subscribers can watch live news, sports and entertainment programming on 22 
channels, including MSNBC, CNBC, ABC News Now, NBC Mobile, FOX Sports, 
Discovery, TLC, C-Span, and other music, sports, fashion, and comedy 
channels.” It also stated that “[t]he fee for MobiTV on the Cingular network 
is $9.99 per month. . . . Because MobiTV uses data, not voice, minutes, 
Cingular highly recommends that customers also subscribe to a Media Works 
Package to provide unlimited data services and help subscribers avoid 
unexpected charges.” 
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Internet. IP technology allows information to be sent and 
received over any broadband or network connection.”  
Mr. Nazari also noted language in a document entitled “AT&T 
Media™ Personalize with Media,” specifically that “Cellular 
Video” is “[n]ot available when off the AT&T-owned wireless 
network. 3G phone required. Monthly subscription to a package 
that includes unlimited MEdia Net usage highly recommended.”28 
Additionally, Mr. Nazari opined that features referenced in an 
AT&T document entitled “Terms and Conditions” — such as 
ringtones, graphics, games, and alerts — were transmitted by 
using a data service, but not specifically by using Internet 
access: “The content that you see here is only transmitted and 
provided to the subscriber over a bigger pipe, if you want to 
call it that. And that is the data network.” These services were 
not Internet access in his opinion. “Internet by definition is a 
data service that can be accessed regardless of which network 
you’re on,” he stated. He stressed that “[t]he distinction here 
is if the content stays in the carrier’s content server and it’s 
downloaded directly from that content server to the customer, 
then it does not constitute internet. It is intranet.”  
                                                     
28
 The document also specified that “Cellular video is charged at stated 
monthly subscription rates or at stated pay per view rates.” The same 
document described MEdia Net as “[y]our access to the mobile Web.” Another 
document in the record entitled “MEdia™ Net Frequently Asked Questions” 
explained that “MEdia Net is the Internet on your AT&T wireless phone. It 
gives you access to all the cool things your phone can do — email, websites, 
games, and more.”  
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Mr. Nazari also expressed the opinion that not all devices 
sold by the Appellant during the tax periods at issue were 
compatible with the Appellant’s Parental Controls or Smart 
Limits features, though he admitted that he could not name any 
specific mobile device that he analyzed with respect to use of 
the device on the Appellant’s network during the tax periods at 
issue.  
Mr. Nazari testified that screening software “can be 
provided one of three ways. It could be either at the operating 
system that is used by the subscriber on a cell phone; it could 
be over a web browser that is used by the subscriber[;] or it 
could be blocked or filtered at the network level before it 
reaches the subscriber.” He relied upon several sources for his 
assertion that not all devices sold by the Appellant were 
compatible with its Parental Controls or Smart Limits features. 
He noted that an online article from the Fox News website 
entitled “AT&T Puts Parental Control on Teens’ Cell Phones” 
reported that AT&T’s Smart Limits feature would not work on an 
iPhone. He also relied upon an article from the website 
InternetSafety.com entitled “InternetSafety.com Urges Parents to 
Child-Proof Apple iPhone, Coupling Apple’s New Parental Controls 
with Online Content Filtering,” quoting that “AT&T’s wireless 
MEdia Net Parental Controls do not work with the iPhone at 
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all.”29 He also cited an article on the website FierceWireless 
entitled “AT&T Adds to Parental Controls with New Mobile Web 
Settings,” quoting that “[s]ome AT&T Smart Limits for Wireless 
features may not be compatible on some wireless connection and 
mobile Internet browsing services.”30 Mr. Nazari also testified 
that a search via “Wikipedia and a few other websites” showed 
that the iPhone did not introduce parental controls until 2008, 
and that his independent research (also via “Wikipedia and a few 
other sources”) concluded that two other operating systems 
“popular with the carrier . . . Symbin . . . and Droid . . . did 
not provide parental controls between 2005 and 2010.” 
Mr. Nazari testified that he is the technical advisor to 
the Rural Wireless Association (“RWA”), formerly known as the 
Rural Telecom Group. He was appointed by the Federal 
Communications Commission’s Chairman to serve on the CSRIC 
Committee (which stands for Communications, Securities, 
Reliability, and Interoperability Council). It is an unpaid 
position. Mr. Nazari testified that “all the wireless carriers” 
participate on the CSRIC Committee. The Appellant contended that 
Mr. Nazari’s work with the RWA, which advocates in favor of 
                                                     
29
 InternetSafety.com is identified in the document as a “leading provider of 
web filtering solutions for consumers and businesses since 1999. The 
company’s flagship software, Safe Eyes®,. . . was rated as the #1 parental 
control solution by America’s leading consumer advocacy publication. Other 
products include Safe Eyes Mobile, the first family-safe browser for the 
iPhone.” The article in large part serves as an endorsement for the Safe Eyes 
Mobile browser. 
30
 When asked by the hearing officer whether the quoted statement was 
accurate, Mr. Nazari replied that “I have no reason to dispute it.” 
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rural carriers’ interests, evidences his bias against the 
Appellant.   
A document in the record entitled “Communications Security, 
Reliability & Interoperability Council Members As of March 17, 
2015” indicated that Mr. Nazari serves on the CSRIC Committee as 
a representative of the RWA and not in his own individual 
capacity. An RWA website excerpt in the record described the RWA 
as “a trade association representing rural wireless carriers who 
each serve fewer than 100,000 subscribers. Another RWA website 
excerpt in the record noted that RWA’s “General Counsel, Carri 
Bennet, and Wireless Technical Advisor, Mehran Nazari, met with 
FCC Commissioner Clyburn’s wireless legal advisor . . . . [and 
RWA] expressed concern that AT&T is suggesting that due to 
potential congestion on its network, it should be allowed to 
treat its roaming partners’ customers differently than it treats 
its own customers by placing the roaming partners’ customers on 
its 2G or 2.5G network rather than its 3G network when the 3G 
network reaches capacity.” 
In its briefs, the Appellant also challenged Mr. Nazari’s 
qualifications and foundation as inadequate to present credible 
and reliable testimony, especially as he had no familiarity with 
the Appellant’s billing practices. The Appellant alluded to his 
reliance on sources such as news articles and Wikipedia. The 
Appellant emphasized that “Wikipedia is a website providing a 
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‘free encyclopedia that anyone can edit’” and that the “site 
itself warns, in bold, that ‘Wikipedia cannot guarantee the 
validity of the information found here’” and that “‘[i]f you 
need specific advice (for example, medical, legal, financial or 
risk management), please seek a professional who is licensed or 
knowledgeable in that area.’” 
V. The Board’s Conclusions 
Based upon the record in its entirety, the Board found that 
the charges at issue for data services were charges for Internet 
access as defined in the ITFA and that the Appellant provided 
sufficient evidence to prove that it satisfied the ITFA’s 
accounting rule and screening software provisions, thus 
exempting the charges at issue from Massachusetts sales tax. The 
Board also found that the escrow mechanism ensured repayment to 
impacted Massachusetts customers as required by G.L. c. 62C, 
§ 37 and 830 CMR 62C.37.1. 
A. Data Services 
The Board found that Mr. Robertson and Mr. Adams provided 
credible testimony establishing that the charges at issue were 
charges for Internet access. As a customer of AT&T and the 
impetus behind the class action that precipitated this matter, 
Mr. Robertson had first-hand knowledge of the data services and 
their capabilities, as well as the tax treatment of competitors 
and various jurisdictions in which he brought similar refund 
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claims. He personally used the data services to access the 
Internet and email.  
Mr. Adams explained that it is common in the industry to 
use the label “data services” as an alternative for Internet 
access and that the label for a service is often influenced by 
how plans are presented to customers rather than tax 
considerations. His comparison of the Appellant’s data services 
to a pipe used to stream content to and from a customer provided 
the Board with a constructive illustration and understanding of 
the capacity a customer purchases when it enters into an 
agreement with the Appellant for data services. This depiction 
aided the Board in finding that the charges at issue were indeed 
charges falling within the ITFA’s definition of “Internet 
access,” as discussed further below in the Board’s Opinion.  
The Board rejected the Commissioner’s theory that using the 
data services to access content available only to customers, 
such as ringtones and video, or for accessing visual voice mail, 
precluded these charges from the ITFA’s definition of “Internet 
access.” Even if the Commissioner’s assertions were true, the 
Board found this use of the data services to be incidental — as 
permitted by the ITFA in defining “Internet access” — and did 
not negate a finding that the charges at issue in toto were 
charges for Internet access.           
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Mr. Nazari, the Commissioner’s expert witness, offered no 
rational basis for the Board to believe that he had any general 
expertise in either Internet or intranet access, let alone both, 
and he had no expertise in the relevant billing practices, 
systems, and codes pertaining to the charges at issue. When 
asked to provide a source for his understanding of the term 
“Internet,” his reply was nebulous: “Every text book, every 
standard that’s written you could look at it and figure out what 
it is.” The Board found that Mr. Robertson’s personal experience 
with the data services and Mr. Adams’ in-house knowledge of what 
the data services allow customers to do were much more reliable 
indicators that the charges at issue constituted charges for 
Internet access.  
B. Accounting for the Charges at Issue 
The Board found that the Appellant presented substantial 
credible testimony and documentation regarding its billing 
systems and billing codes, as well as invoices issued to 
customers, all of which supported its compliance with the ITFA’s 
accounting rule provision during the tax periods at issue by 
showing segregation of the charges at issue from charges for 
other services such as voice and text messaging.  
Mr. Adams discussed AT&T’s proprietary billing systems — 
Care and Telegence — and explained the detail captured by 
Telegence, the larger of the two systems and the one primarily 
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relied upon by the Appellant for the information presented in 
this matter. Telegence maintained records for each of the 
Appellant’s Massachusetts customers, including monthly invoices 
and line items for individual services and associated tax. The 
system tracked charges to a level sufficient to segregate the 
charges at issue.  
Mr. Adams spoke at length about billing codes, feature 
codes, and SOC codes. These codes facilitated identification of 
the charges at issue. He explained that thousands of codes were 
reviewed to segregate the specific codes for Internet access. 
Although thousands of codes were identified as encompassing the 
charges at issue, Mr. Adams stressed that at the end of the day 
all of these identified codes represented the same service — 
Internet access. Each transaction involving the charges at issue 
comprised transactions solely for Internet access.  
Mr. Adams testified to numerous invoices and billing 
records to explain and demonstrate that the charges at issue 
were not packaged with charges for other services. When the 
Appellant realized it had erroneously incorporated certain 
billing codes as part of abatement and refund claims filed 
nationwide, including the Massachusetts Abatement and Refund 
Claim, letters were sent to apprise jurisdictions of this error.  
Mr. Adams emphasized that if a customer used the data 
services to access content, this content was either (1) content 
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provided to the customer at no additional cost or from a website 
over which the Appellant had no control, or (2) the charge for 
such content, such as for a ringtone or game, was itemized 
separately from the charges at issue and was not included in the 
Massachusetts Abatement and Refund Claim.  
The Board found that Mr. Nazari presented a wholly 
extraneous dissertation on network design and the need for 
carriers to incorporate common elements and standards so as to 
accommodate roaming customers and communications with customers 
on other carriers’ networks. Even if a commonality of network 
design exists among carriers, carriers do not necessarily adhere 
to the same billing systems and codes. Care and Telegence are 
custom billing systems and the billing codes harvested from 
these systems (Telegence in particular) to track the charges at 
issue are native to AT&T. There is no industry-wide set of 
billing codes, as Mr. Nazari so acknowledged. He also 
acknowledged that he has never examined AT&T’s billing 
practices, systems, and codes until his engagement for this 
matter, and has never reviewed AT&T’s billing codes in 
consulting with other clients. His conclusion that codes 
containing the term “bundle” must mean a bundling of services 
was merely a superficial guess, disproved by Mr. Adams’ 
explanation that a bundle could refer to a media bundle for 
marketing purposes rather than a bundling of services.    
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Improbably, Mr. Nazari’s own testimony supported the 
Appellant, if either party at all. For instance, Mr. Nazari 
testified that carriers have the ability to bill a customer 
separately for services and that this technology is an integral 
part of the network design. “It’s integral,” he stated, “because 
if they can’t measure it, they can’t bill it. And if they don’t 
bill it, they don’t make enough money or revenue.” The Board 
found this testimony more supportive of the Appellant’s case 
than the Commissioner’s, in effect corroborating that specific 
charges, such as the charges at issue, can be and were measured 
and billed separately.  
C. Screening Software 
The Board found that Ms. Leatherberry’s testimony, along 
with exhibits in the record, established that the Appellant 
complied with the screening software provision of the ITFA 
during the tax periods at issue. Ms. Leatherberry, while not 
versed in the technicalities of how the Appellant’s Parental 
Controls and Smart Limits features worked, was aware of the 
capabilities of these features and their function to assist 
customers in restricting device use. The Appellant relayed the 
availability of these features to its customers in myriad ways, 
from in-store brochures and box inserts to posting information 
on its website.   
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Though the Parental Controls and Smart Limits features were 
not compatible with every device sold by the Appellant and the 
restrictive features inherent to some devices sold by the 
Appellant — such as the iPhone — were not available during all 
of the tax periods at issue, the Board found this was not fatal 
to compliance with the screening software provision. The ITFA 
does not mandate that screening software be compatible with all 
devices, only that such software be offered to customers at the 
time that they entered into an agreement for Internet access, 
which the Board found occurred in this instance. 
D. Escrow Mechanism 
The Board found that Mr. Robertson’s narration of the class 
action and the ensuing settlement agreement, escrow agreement, 
and plan of distribution underscored the escrow mechanism in 
place to ensure that impacted customers would be repaid if a 
jurisdiction, including Massachusetts, refunds sales tax on 
charges such as the charges at issue. Though the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts is not a party to the settlement agreement, the 
settlement agreement’s terms dictate that the Appellant will not 
retain any refund amount. If a refund is not paid directly to an 
escrow account, the Appellant must remit that amount into the 
escrow account held by the Bank of New York Mellon as the Escrow 
Agent. If a taxing jurisdiction issues only a credit instead of 
a refund, then the Appellant must fund the escrow account and 
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take a credit against tax going forward. The escrow account 
remains in the custody of the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois. Significantly, impacted 
Massachusetts customers were advised of — by multiple methods — 
and consented (except for the four customers who opted out)
31
 to 
the escrow mechanism as the means of repayment, as well as to 
the deduction of various fees prior to distribution. 
Distributions from the escrow account are handled by Analysis 
Research Planning Corporation, the named Settlement 
Administrator, not by the Appellant. The Board found this 
evidence sufficient to meet the repayment requisite of 
G.L. c. 62C, § 37 and 830 CMR 62C.37.1. 
E. The Commissioner’s Expert Witness and Bias 
While recognizing Mr. Nazari’s involvement with the RWA and 
its history of advocating for rural carriers’ interests, the 
Board felt it unnecessary to make any finding of bias — as urged 
by the Appellant — because Mr. Nazari’s testimony lacked 
credibility on its own standing. His testimony was largely 
speculative. He revealed no expert knowledge of or experience 
with the Appellant’s network, billing practices, billing 
systems, or billing codes, or any devices used on the 
Appellant’s network. Websites such as Wikipedia and 
                                                     
31
 In a letter dated March 28, 2011, from counsel for the Appellant to the 
Massachusetts Department of Revenue, the Appellant submitted a revised claim, 
reducing the abatement and refund sought by $1.47 based upon customers who 
had opted out of the settlement agreement. 
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FierceWireless do not carry more weight because Mr. Nazari cited 
them in his testimony. The Board could not rely upon an expert 
who lacked relevant knowledge and formulated his opinions upon a 
foundation of unverified Internet sources.  
F. Conclusion  
Accordingly, based upon the record in its entirety, the 
Board found that the Appellant met its burden of proof in 
establishing that it was entitled to the abatement and refund 
sought in this appeal. 
OPINION 
This appeal raises the question of whether the Appellant 
improperly collected and remitted Massachusetts sales tax 
imposed on the charges at issue for the tax periods at issue in 
contravention of the ITFA. The Board found and ruled that the 
Appellant collected and remitted such tax erroneously because 
the ITFA precluded taxation of the charges at issue. In reaching 
its ultimate conclusion, the Board determined that (1) 
Massachusetts did not generally impose and actually enforce a 
sales tax on Internet access prior to October 1, 1998, and so 
Massachusetts did not fall within the grandfather clause of the 
ITFA permitting the continued taxation of Internet access; (2) 
the charges at issue were charges for Internet access; (3) the 
Appellant complied with the accounting rule provision of the 
ITFA; and (4) the Appellant complied with the screening software 
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provision of the ITFA. The Board also determined that the escrow 
mechanism outlined in the class action settlement agreement and 
associated documents sufficiently demonstrated that any impacted 
Massachusetts customers
32
 would receive payment of the refund.  
I. Massachusetts Did Not Generally Impose and Enforce a Tax on 
Internet Access Prior to October 1, 1998 
 
The ITFA prohibits the taxation of Internet access by any 
state or political subdivision unless “a tax on Internet access 
[] was generally imposed and actually enforced prior to October 
1, 1998.”33 ITFA §§ 1101 and 1104. See also Technical Information 
Release 05-8: Taxation of Internet Access, Electronic Commerce 
and Telecommunications Services: Recent Federal Legislation. The 
Act construes “generally imposed and actually enforced” as 
meaning that prior to October 1, 1998 —    
(A) the tax was authorized by statute; and 
 
(B) either — 
 
(i) a provider of Internet access services had a 
reasonable opportunity to know, by virtue of a rule or 
other public proclamation made by the appropriate 
administrative agency of the State or political 
subdivision thereof, that such agency has interpreted 
and applied such tax to Internet access services; or 
 
(ii) a State or political subdivision thereof 
generally collected such tax on charges for Internet 
access.  
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 See footnote 3, supra.  
33
 Passage of successive legislation has extended this grandfather clause, 
which currently sunsets on June 30, 2020. See P.L. 107-75, P.L. 108-435, P.L. 
110-108, P.L. 113-164, P.L. 113-235, P.L. 114-53, P.L. 114-100, P.L. 114-113, 
and P.L. 114-125. 
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ITFA §§ 1101 and 1104.  
General Laws c. 64H, § 2 states that  
an excise is hereby imposed upon sales at retail in 
the commonwealth, by any vendor, of tangible personal 
property or of services performed in the commonwealth 
at the rate of 6.25 per cent of the gross receipts of 
the vendor from all such sales of such property or 
services, except as otherwise provided in this 
chapter. The excise shall be paid by the vendor to the 
commissioner at the time provided for filing the 
return required by section sixteen of chapter sixty-
two C. 
  
G.L. c. 64H, § 2.
34
 In 1990, services were expanded to include 
telecommunications services for purposes of the Massachusetts 
sales tax. St. 1990, c. 121 and St. 1990, c. 150. See also 
Technical Information Release 90-8: Taxation of Sales and Use of 
Telecommunications Services (“Chapters 121 and 150 have extended 
the sales and use tax in G.L. c. 64H and 64I to the retail sale 
or use of telecommunications services in Massachusetts.”). 
Subsequently, telecommunications services were defined as 
any transmission of messages or information by 
electronic or similar means, between or among points 
by wire, cable, fiberoptics, laser, microwave, radio, 
satellite, or similar facilities, but not including 
cable television. Telecommunications services shall be 
deemed to be services for purposes of this chapter and 
chapter sixty-four I. 
  
G.L. c. 64H, § 1.  
                                                     
34
 The statute was amended on June 29, 2009, effective August 1, 2009, to read 
“6.25 per cent.” St. 2009, c. 27, §§ 53 and 155. Previously, the statute read 
“five percent.” G.L. c. 64H, § 2 (as in effect prior to St. 2009, c. 27, §§ 
53 and 155).  
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Guidance issued by the Commissioner, anticipating the 
enactment of Massachusetts legislation concerning Internet 
access, clearly indicated that Internet access was considered a 
taxable telecommunications service under G.L. c. 64H, § 1:  
This Technical Information Release [] is being issued 
to provide for a temporary moratorium on collection of 
sales or use tax on the following telecommunications 
services: Internet access services, electronic mail 
services, electronic bulletin board services, web 
hosting services or similar online computer services. 
  
Technical Information Release 97-10: Temporary Sales Tax 
Moratorium on Internet Access and Related Telecommunications 
Services (“Bills approved by both the Massachusetts House (H.B. 
4608) and Senate (S.B. 1912) and currently in Conference 
Committee exempt the above services from tax retroactive to 
1990.”). 
In 1997, the Massachusetts Legislature passed St. 1997, 
c. 88, §§ 23, 102, and 114 (“Amendment”), amending the 
definition of “telecommunications services” in G.L. c. 64H, § 1 
to specifically exclude “internet access services.” St. 1997, 
c. 88, §§ 23, 102, and 114 (“Section 1 of chapter 64H of the 
General Laws, as so appearing, is hereby amended by inserting 
after the word ‘television,’ in line 194, the following words: — 
internet access services, electronic mail services, electronic 
bulletin board services, web hosting services or similar on-line 
computer services.”).  
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The statute’s definition of “telecommunications services” 
read as follows after passage of the Amendment: 
[A]ny transmission of messages or information by 
electronic or similar means, between or among points 
by wire, cable, fiberoptics, laser, microwave, radio, 
satellite, or similar facilities, but not including 
cable television, internet access services, electronic 
mail services, electronic bulletin board services, web 
hosting services or similar on-line computer services. 
Telecommunications services shall be deemed to be 
services for purposes of this chapter and chapter 
sixty-four I.   
 
G.L. c. 64H, § 1. The Amendment retroactively took effect as of 
September 1, 1990, and expired on July 1, 1999. St. 1997, c. 88, 
§§ 23, 102, and 114.
35
 Thus, while the Massachusetts definition 
of “telecommunications services” for purpose of imposing the 
sales tax reverted to its former version on July 1, 1999 — with 
Internet access not excluded as a telecommunications service — 
prior to October 1, 1998, there was no tax on Internet access 
“generally imposed and actually enforced” in Massachusetts. 
Consequently, the Massachusetts sales tax does not fall within 
the grandfather clause of the ITFA for purposes of imposing a 
                                                     
35
 The Amendment also suspended the abatement statute of limitations in 
G.L. c. 62C, § 37 for purposes of the excluded services. See St. 1997, c. 88, 
§§ 23, 102, and 114. See also Technical Information Release 99-2: Taxation of 
the Internet, Electronic Commerce and Telecommunications Services: Recent 
Federal and Massachusetts Legislation (“Abatement applications concerning tax 
on Internet access and similar on-line services are not subject to the time 
limitations contained in G.L. c. 62C, § 37, or the Abatement Regulation, 
830 CMR 62C.37.1(2). Therefore, abatement applications for tax paid on or 
after September 1, 1990 will be considered, providing the taxpayer has 
adequate records and otherwise meets the requirements of 830 CMR 
62C.37.1(4).”).   
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sales tax on Internet access and the ITFA generally exempts the 
imposition of such tax. ITFA §§ 1101 and 1104.        
The Board held, however, that in the absence of exemption 
by the ITFA, a taxpayer can properly be subject to Massachusetts 
sales tax on Internet access. ITFA §§ 1101 and 1106. With no 
further Massachusetts legislative intervention after the July 1, 
1999 expiration of the Amendment, Internet access is a 
telecommunications service subject to Massachusetts sales tax. 
See State Bd. of Retirement v. Boston Retirement Bd., 391 Mass. 
92, 94 (1984) (“We follow a principal rule of statutory 
interpretation that we need not look beyond the words of the 
statute where the language is plain and unambiguous.”); New 
England Medical Center Hospital, Inc. v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, 381 Mass. 748, 750 (1980) (“A statute is plain and 
unambiguous if ‘virtually anyone competent to understand it, and 
desiring fairly and impartially to ascertain its signification, 
would attribute to the expression in its context a meaning such 
as the one we derive, rather than any other; and would consider 
any different meaning, by comparison, strained, or far-fetched, 
or unusual, or unlikely.’”). To hold otherwise would give no 
meaning to the Amendment, both the Legislature’s particular 
cause to exclude Internet access from the definition of taxable 
telecommunications services and its decision to limit this 
exclusion to three years. See Sullivan v. Town of Brookline, 
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435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001) (“It is clear that the Legislature 
intended for retirees returning to work after five or more years 
of retirement to complete retraining before any reinstatement 
right should inhere in them.”).  
The Commissioner’s guidance has tracked the impact of the 
Amendment and the ITFA. Technical Information Release 99-2: 
Taxation of the Internet, Electronic Commerce and 
Telecommunications Services: Recent Federal and Massachusetts 
Legislation states that “[t]he exclusion contained in the 
Massachusetts statute is retroactive to September 1, 1990; the 
terms of the legislation state that the exclusion expires on 
July 1, 1999” and that “[t]he Federal Act prohibits 
Massachusetts from taxing Internet access, as defined in the 
federal statute, for three years from October 21, 1998.” 
Technical Information Release 05-8: Taxation of Internet Access, 
Electronic Commerce and Telecommunications Services: Recent 
Federal Legislation states that “[t]his Technical Information 
Release [] is being issued to explain the effect of recent 
federal legislation that extends the Internet Tax Freedom Act 
until November of 2007.”36  
The Board construed this guidance, including any regulatory 
changes issued by the Commissioner, as the Commissioner’s effort 
to incorporate and explain the impact of the Amendment and the 
                                                     
36
 See footnote 2, supra.  
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ITFA on Massachusetts tax practice and to advise the public that 
if the ITFA were to expire, Internet access charges would be 
taxable. The Board did not interpret this guidance as otherwise 
seeking to exempt the imposition of Massachusetts sales tax on 
Internet access as a telecommunications service under 
Massachusetts law.
37
  
II. The Charges at Issue for Data Services Were Charges for 
Internet Access Under the ITFA 
 
As initially enacted and throughout the tax periods at 
issue, the ITFA has defined the term “Internet” as “collectively 
the myriad of computer and telecommunications facilities, 
including equipment and operating software, which comprise the 
interconnected world-wide network of networks that employ the 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, or any 
                                                     
37
 The Board interpreted changes made in 2003, for instance, to 830 CMR 
64H.1.6 — after implementation of the Act in 1998 and after expiration of the 
Amendment in 1999 — that reference Internet access as a non-taxable service, 
or references in Technical Information Release 05-8: Taxation of Internet 
Access, Electronic Commerce and Telecommunications Services: Recent Federal 
Legislation to Internet access as a non-taxable service, as stemming directly 
from the Act’s preemption of Internet access taxation. Technical Information 
Release 14-10: Potential Expiration of Federal Internet Tax Freedom Act and 
Technical Information Release 15-8: Potential Expiration of Federal Internet 
Tax Freedom Act, while issued after the tax periods at issue, also supported 
the Board’s interpretation that Massachusetts can tax Internet access in the 
absence of the ITFA: “In light of the distinct possibility that Congress may 
allow ITFA to expire and then subsequently enact a retroactive extension of 
the Act, as it has done in the past, the Department is hereby advising 
vendors of Internet access to customers in Massachusetts that for purposes of 
sales tax collection and remission, those vendors may continue to rely on the 
lists of taxable telecommunications services and non-taxable and exempt 
services, including Internet access charges, as published in TIR 05-8, until 
further notice from [the Department of Revenue] . . . This TIR does not 
relieve purchasers of taxable services of potential use tax liability in the 
event that ITFA expires and Congress does not enact an extension; however, 
any such liability does not need to be reported until further notice from 
[the Department of Revenue] and no penalties would apply to late reporting or 
payment of such use tax.”  
ATB 2018-308 
 
predecessor or successor protocols to such protocol, to 
communicate information of all kinds by wire or radio.” ITFA 
§ 1104 (renumbered as § 1105 by P.L. 108-435 on December 3, 
2004).  
The term “Internet access” was initially defined in the 
ITFA as “a service that enables users to access content, 
information, electronic mail, or other services offered over the 
Internet, and may also include access to proprietary content, 
information, and other services as part of a package of services 
offered to users. Such term does not include telecommunications 
services.” ITFA § 1104 (as originally enacted).  
As amended on December 3, 2004, by the Internet Tax 
Nondiscrimination Act, P.L. 108-435, codified as a note to 47 
U.S.C. § 609, the definition of “Internet access” in the ITFA 
was changed to read as follows:  
[A] service that enables users to access content, 
information, electronic mail, or other services 
offered over the Internet, and may also include access 
to proprietary content, information, and other 
services as part of a package of services offered to 
users. The term ‘Internet access’ does not include 
telecommunications services, except to the extent such 
services are purchased, used, or sold by a provider of 
Internet access to provide Internet access. 
  
ITFA § 1105 (as amended by P.L. 108-435).  
The definition of “Internet access” was further amended on 
October 31, 2007, by the Internet Tax Freedom Act Amendments Act 
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of 2007, P.L. 110-108, codified as a note to 47 U.S.C. § 609, to 
read as follows: 
(A) [Internet access] means a service that enables 
users to connect to the Internet to access content, 
information, or other services offered over the 
Internet; 
 
(B) includes the purchase, use or sale of 
telecommunications by a provider of a service 
described in subparagraph (A) to the extent such 
telecommunications are purchased, used or sold — 
 
(i) to provide such service; or 
 
(ii) to otherwise enable users to access content, 
information or other services offered over the 
Internet; 
 
(C) includes services that are incidental to the 
provision of the service described in subparagraph (A) 
when furnished to users as part of such service, such 
as a home page, electronic mail, and instant messaging 
(including voice- and video-capable electronic mail 
and instant messaging), video clips, and personal 
electronic storage capacity;  
 
(D) does not include voice, audio or video 
programming, or other products and services (except 
services described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or 
(E)) that utilize Internet protocol or any successor 
protocol and for which there is a charge, regardless 
of whether such charge is separately stated or 
aggregated with the charge for services described in 
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E); and 
 
(E) includes a homepage, electronic mail and instant 
messaging (including voice- and video-capable 
electronic mail and instant messaging), video clips, 
and personal electronic storage capacity, that are 
provided independently or not packaged with Internet 
access. 
  
ITFA § 1105 (as amended by P.L. 110-108).  
ATB 2018-310 
 
In the present matter, the Board found and ruled that the 
Appellant provided sufficient credible evidence to conclude that 
the charges at issue for data services were charges for Internet 
access within the ITFA’s definition of the term. Mr. Adams 
explained that it was common for the Appellant and for the 
industry to refer to Internet access as data services, and that 
the naming of terms was often influenced by how plans were 
presented to customers rather than tax considerations. He 
described the charges at issue as akin to a pipe giving 
customers the ability to stream content and to send and receive 
emails, and that the charges at issue only comprised charges for 
the ability to access the content, i.e., the amount of content, 
not for the content itself.  
Mr. Robertson, a customer, understood data services as 
meaning Internet access and personally used these services to 
access the Internet and email. In contrast, Mr. Nazari’s vague 
generalities about data services and Internet and intranet 
access provided no useful insight into the charges at issue, and 
the Board declined to credit his testimony. See General Mills, 
Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 440 Mass. 154, 161 (2003) (“The 
credibility of witnesses, the weight of the evidence, and 
inferences that reasonably may be drawn from the evidence are 
matters for the board.”) (citation omitted). The Board instead 
focused on the substance of the charges at issue rather than 
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their label, and determined that these charges were in fact 
charges for Internet access under the ITFA.  
The Board considered the Commissioner’s reliance on ITFA 
§ 1105(D) to be inapposite here. That subparagraph specifically 
excludes “voice, audio or video programming . . . that utilize 
Internet protocol or any successor protocol and for which there 
is a charge, regardless of whether such charge is separately 
stated or aggregated with the charge for services described in 
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E).” ITFA § 1105(D). While the 
Appellant’s customers could subscribe to video programming such 
as MobiTV and Cellular Video,
38
 charges for this content, as well 
as charges for features such as ringtones and games, were not 
included in the Massachusetts Abatement and Refund Claim. Even 
if these features used the charges at issue to access the 
purchased content, the Board construed this access as part of 
the services incidental to the “service that enables users to 
connect to the Internet to access content, information, or other 
services offered over the Internet.” ITFA §§ 1105(A) and (C). 
The fundamental capacity of the Appellant’s data services was to 
provide customers with the capability of connecting to the 
Internet, within the meaning of the ITFA. See id.    
  
                                                     
38
 See footnotes 27 and 28, supra.  
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III. The Appellant Satisfied the Accounting Rule Provision 
 
On December 3, 2004, the Internet Tax Nondiscrimination 
Act, P.L. 108-435, codified as a note to 47 U.S.C. § 609, 
amended the ITFA by adding the accounting rule provision:  
(a) In General. - If charges for Internet access are 
aggregated with and not separately stated from charges 
for telecommunications services or other charges that 
are subject to taxation, then the charges for Internet 
access may be subject to taxation unless the Internet 
access provider can reasonably identify the charges 
for Internet access from its books and records kept in 
the regular course of business. 
 
(b) Definitions. - In this section: 
 
(1) Charges for Internet access. - The term 
‘charges for Internet access’ means all charges 
for Internet access as defined in section 
1105(5). 
 
(2) Charges for telecommunications services. - 
The term ‘charges for telecommunications 
services’ means all charges for 
telecommunications services, except to the extent 
such services are purchased, used, or sold by a 
provider of Internet access to provide Internet 
access. 
 
ITFA § 1106 (as added by P.L. 108-435). The accounting rule 
provision was amended on October 31, 2007, by the Internet Tax 
Freedom Act Amendments Act of 2007, P.L. 110-108, codified as a 
note to 47 U.S.C. § 609, as follows: 
(a) In General. - If charges for Internet access are 
aggregated with and not separately stated from charges 
for telecommunications or other charges that are 
subject to taxation, then the charges for Internet 
access may be subject to taxation unless the Internet 
access provider can reasonably identify the charges 
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for Internet access from its books and records kept in 
the regular course of business. 
 
(b) Definitions. - In this section: 
 
(1) Charges for Internet access. - The term 
‘charges for Internet access’ means all charges 
for Internet access as defined in section 
1105(5). 
 
(2) Charges for telecommunications. - The term 
‘charges for telecommunications’ means all 
charges for telecommunications, except to the 
extent such telecommunications are purchased, 
used, or sold by a provider of Internet access to 
provide Internet access or to otherwise enable 
users to access content, information, or other 
services offered over the Internet. 
 
ITFA § 1106 (as amended by P.L. 110-108).  
Turning to the matter at hand, Telegence, the custom AT&T 
billing system primarily relied upon by the Appellant to file 
the Massachusetts Abatement and Refund Claim, captured 
individual transactions for each customer down to the level of 
particular services purchased by a customer. Mr. Adams testified 
to the Appellant’s proprietary billing codes and how these codes 
enabled the Appellant to segregate the charges at issue from 
charges for other services, such as voice and text messaging and 
charges for bundled services. Mr. Adams also testified to 
numerous customer invoices, identifying individual line items on 
invoices that pertained solely to the charges at issue, along 
with the tax imposed on these charges.  
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Further, the root of this and similar matters stemmed from 
the class action, which originated with Mr. Robertson, a 
customer who detected — from reviewing AT&T bills — that sales 
tax was included on charges for data services, the charges at 
issue in this matter. If Mr. Robertson could detect such detail 
from an invoice, as he testified, then the charges for data 
services were separately stated.  
The Board found and ruled that this testimony and exhibits 
in the record amply demonstrated compliance with the accounting 
rule provision of the ITFA. See ITFA § 1106. See Bayer Corp. v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, 436 Mass. 302, 308 (2002) (“[W]e have 
consistently ruled that assessment of the credibility of 
witnesses is a matter for the board.”) (citations omitted). 
Conversely, Mr. Nazari’s speculation as to the Appellant’s 
billing systems, practices, and codes was inadequate to either 
advance the Commissioner’s case or detract from the credibility 
of the Appellant’s witnesses and exhibits. See id.    
 The Commissioner continued his refrain that the charges at 
issue cannot fall within the requisites of the ITFA because 
customers can use the data services to access features that are 
not considered Internet access, such as the purchase of a 
ringtone or game only available to a customer on the Appellant’s 
network. The Commissioner argued that since the quantity of data 
used to download such features was not segregated from the data 
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used to access the Internet, the Appellant failed to satisfy the 
accounting rule provision. As the Board found and ruled above, 
charges for features such as ringtones and games were separate 
and excluded from the Massachusetts Abatement and Refund Claim. 
Even if such features used the data services for purposes of 
downloading the content, this was incidental to the “service 
that enables users to connect to the Internet to access content, 
information, or other services offered over the Internet.” ITFA 
§§ 1105(A) and (C). Further, the ITFA does not require that 
these incidental uses be itemized separately from using the 
service to access the Internet, and so the Board declined to 
incorporate this burden into its analysis. See ITFA § 1106. See 
also Adams v. Assessors of Westport, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 180, 183-
84 (2010) (“We strive to adopt a reading ‘consistent with the 
purpose of the statute and in harmony with the statute as a 
whole.’ [A]nd we also bear in mind the general principle 
favoring strict construction of tax statutes to resolve doubt in 
favor of taxpayers.”) (citations omitted). 
The Board was also unpersuaded by the Commissioner’s 
reliance on Verizon New England, Inc. v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2011-457. The 
Commissioner contended that visual voice mail requires the 
Appellant’s data services to function, but does not involve 
accessing the Internet. Thus, according to the Commissioner, the 
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charges at issue were not sufficiently segregated to account for 
these disparate uses.  
In making his argument, the Commissioner described two 
types of voice mail: (1) standard voice mail, a voice service 
that requires a customer to call into a server and retrieve 
messages in a linear fashion, i.e., in the order received, and 
(2) visual voice mail, a feature permitting a customer to view 
and retrieve messages via a phone screen in a non-linear 
fashion. Relying on Verizon New England for the Board’s finding 
that voice mail is a taxable telecommunications service, the 
Commissioner maintained that visual voice mail is also a taxable 
telecommunications service indiscriminately co-mingled here with 
Internet access.   
In Verizon New England, the Board found that the charges 
made by the taxpayer “for voice mail services were charges for 
the ‘transmission of messages or information by electronic or 
similar means, between or among points’ and that [the taxpayer] 
properly reported sales taxes on its voice mail services.” Id. 
at 2011-475. Here, the Commissioner admitted that standard voice 
mail generally falls within a voice service, the type of service 
consistent with the Board’s ruling in Verizon New England, 
Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2011-457. The record did 
not indicate that visual voice mail was anything other than an 
incidental feature using the data services to interface with 
ATB 2018-317 
 
standard voice mail, rather than a stand-alone taxable 
telecommunications service, and the Board declined to broaden 
its ruling in Verizon New England to encompass visual voice mail 
or to otherwise find that the Appellant had not complied with 
the accounting rule provision of the ITFA. See ITFA § 1106.    
IV. The Appellant Satisfied the Screening Software Provision  
 
The ITFA moratorium “shall [] not apply with respect to an 
Internet access provider, unless, at the time of entering into 
an agreement with a customer for the provision of Internet 
access services, such provider offers such customer (either for 
a fee or at no charge) screening software that is designed to 
permit the customer to limit access to material on the Internet 
that is harmful to minors.” ITFA § 1101. This screening software 
provision defines the term “Internet access provider” as “a 
person engaged in the business of providing a computer and 
communications facility through which a customer may obtain 
access to the Internet, but does not include a common carrier to 
the extent that it provides only telecommunications services.” 
Id. It defines the term “Internet access services” as “the 
provision of computer and communications services through which 
a customer using a computer and a modem or other communications 
device may obtain access to the Internet, but does not include 
telecommunications services provided by a common carrier.” Id. 
It defines the term “screening software” as software that is 
ATB 2018-318 
 
designed to permit a person to limit access to material on the 
Internet that is harmful to minors.” Id.  
The Appellant claimed that the ITFA’s screening software 
requisite did not apply in this matter because the Massachusetts 
sales tax at issue here is a tax imposed on a customer and the 
screening software provision limits the moratorium to taxes 
borne by an Internet access provider. The Appellant also claimed 
that it is not an “Internet access provider” as that term is 
defined in the screening software provision – the Appellant 
stressed that it does not provide a computer to its customers 
and merely resells devices to customers or customers purchase a 
device elsewhere. Regardless, the Appellant maintained that it 
met the requisites of the screening software provision by 
offering its Parental Controls and Smart Limits features. 
Because the Board found that at the time of entering into a 
contract for Internet access the Appellant offered its customers 
screening software designed to limit access to material on the 
Internet that is harmful to minors, the Board determined that it 
was unnecessary to analyze whether or not the screening software 
applied to a tax imposed on a purchaser rather than a vendor.   
The evidence supported the Appellant’s contention that it 
offered its customers relevant screening software at the time 
that they entered into an agreement for the provision of 
Internet access services. Ms. Leatherberry provided credible 
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testimony as to numerous documents and website pages available 
during the tax periods at issue to inform customers of the 
Appellant’s Parental Controls and Smart Limits features. See 
Cummington School of the Arts, Inc. v. Assessors of Cummington, 
373 Mass. 597, 605 (1977) (“The credibility of witnesses, the 
weight of the evidence, and inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence are matters for the board.”). These features clearly 
were “designed to permit a person to limit access to material on 
the Internet that is harmful to minors,” in accordance with the 
ITFA’s screening software provision. ITFA § 1101. The ITFA does 
not require that this screening software be compatible with all 
devices sold by the Appellant and/or used by its customers, only 
that it be designed for the purpose articulated in the screening 
software provision, i.e., restriction of use by minors. 
Consequently, the Board declined to follow the Commissioner’s 
contention that incompatibility of the Parental Controls or 
Smart Limits features with certain devices is fatal to 
compliance with ITFA § 1101.  
The Board also rejected the Commissioner’s carefully 
selected definitions of the term “offer” in its determination 
that the Appellant indeed offered screening software at the time 
a customer entered into an agreement for Internet access. Since 
the ITFA’s screening software provision does not define the 
term, the Board turned to the definition of “offer” as Merriam-
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Webster defines it in a broad sense “to make available.” Offer, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/ 
offer (last visited April 17, 2018). See also Doherty v. 
Planning Board of Scituate, 467 Mass. 560, 569 (2014) 
(“‘When a statute does not define its words we give them 
their usual and accepted meanings, as long as these meanings 
are consistent with the statutory purpose.’”) (citation 
omitted). Ms. Leatherberry’s testimony established that 
information on the Parental Controls and Smart Limits features 
was made available to customers via an abundance of mechanisms, 
from in-store brochures to websites to box inserts. The Board 
found and ruled this was sufficient to establish compliance with 
the ITFA’s screening software provision. ITFA § 1101.           
V. The Appellant Is Entitled to an Abatement and a Refund of 
the Sales Tax at Issue 
 
When a taxpayer claims to be aggrieved by the refusal of 
the Commissioner to abate or to refund a tax, the Board has 
jurisdiction to determine whether the Commissioner erred by 
refusing to abate or to refund the subject tax. See G.L. c. 62C, 
§ 39.  
The Board’s review under G.L. c. 62C, § 39 of the 
Commissioner’s refusal to abate or to refund a tax includes a 
review of the two discreet determinations the Commissioner is 
authorized to make under G.L. c. 62C, § 37; the Commissioner is 
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authorized to abate a tax that is “excessive in amount or 
illegal” but may withhold a refund of tax until the taxpayer 
“establishes to the satisfaction of the commissioner, under such 
regulations as the commissioner may prescribe” that the taxpayer 
has repaid the tax to its purchaser.
39
 Hearings before the Board 
are conducted de novo, Space Building Corp. v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, 413 Mass. 445, 451 (1992), and the Board considers all 
of the evidence of record to determine whether a taxpayer has 
met its burden of proving its entitlement to an abatement and a 
refund.  
The Board determined that the escrow mechanism instituted 
by means of the settlement agreement, escrow agreement, and plan 
of distribution was sufficient to satisfy the repayment 
requisite of G.L. c. 62C, § 37. Mr. Robertson detailed the 
process of repayment by way of the escrow mechanism and 
emphasized that the Appellant relinquished all rights to any 
refund amount and that the escrow account remains in the custody 
of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
                                                     
39
 The regulation at 830 CMR 62C.37.1 is silent as to the type or quantum of 
evidence necessary to satisfy the G.L. c. 62C, § 37 repayment requisite, 
simply stating in pertinent part that a vendor must establish that “no refund 
of money shall be made until the operator or vendor establishes, to the 
satisfaction of the Commissioner, that it has repaid or credited or will 
repay or credit any purchaser who has paid the tax to the operator or vendor 
in the amount for which the application is made.” Cf Kimberly-Clark 
Corporation v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports 2011-1, affirmed by, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 65 (2013) (finding that the 
regulation and Technical Information Release provided guidance as to the type 
of evidence that would satisfy the “clear and convincing” standard under the 
add-back statutes). 
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Illinois. The Board found his testimony to be credible and ruled 
that the evidence of record established that the Appellant would 
satisfy the repayment requisite of G.L. c. 62C, § 37. 
The Board dismissed the Commissioner’s assertion that the 
Board would be acting beyond its authority by determining that 
the escrow mechanism fulfills the repayment requisite of 
G.L. c. 62C, § 37. Pursuant to G.L. c. 62C, § 39, the Board has 
authority over matters involving “[a]ny person aggrieved by the 
refusal of the commissioner to abate or to refund any tax, in 
whole or in part, whether such refusal results from the denial 
of an abatement application made under section 36 or section 
37.” G.L. c. 62C, § 39 (emphasis added). The Commissioner’s 
theory would create an anomaly, contrary to the Board’s 
authority under G.L. c. 62C, § 39, where the Board could 
determine that a refund was due to a taxpayer pursuant to 
G.L. c. 62C, § 37, but could not order a refund because of the 
repayment requisite of G.L. c. 62C, § 37.  
The Commissioner also contended that the settlement 
agreement is a private agreement, is not binding on the 
Commonwealth, and has no relevance in this matter. Hence the 
Board should accord it no weight. While the Board agreed that 
the Commonwealth is neither a party to nor bound by the 
settlement agreement, the Commissioner failed to consider the 
evidentiary value of the settlement agreement rather than its 
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binding capacity. See In re: AT&T Mobility Wireless Data Servs. 
Sales Tax Litig., 789 F. Supp. 2d 935, 983 (N.D. Ill., E. Div., 
2011) (“The Settlement does not purport to dictate to any state 
or local authority the makeup of its applicable law.”). The 
Board’s determination relied upon the settlement agreement as 
proof of the intent and establishment of the mechanism to ensure 
repayment to impacted customers. 
 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of its analysis of the record and applicable 
legal provisions and case law, the Board ruled that the charges 
at issue were exempt from Massachusetts sales tax. The charges 
at issue were for Internet access as defined in the ITFA and the 
Appellant provided evidence sufficient to establish its 
compliance with the ITFA’s accounting rule and screening 
software provisions.  
Further, the escrow mechanism instituted as part of the 
class action settlement demonstrated that the Appellant would 
relinquish any control over the amount abated and that such 
amount would be distributed pursuant to a settlement agreed to 
by impacted customers who had not opted out of the settlement. 
Accordingly, the Board found and ruled that the Appellant 
satisfied the repayment requisite of G.L. c. 62C, § 37, as it 
applied to the Commissioner. Additionally, the Board found and 
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ruled that the Appellant was otherwise entitled to an abatement 
and refund under G.L. c. 62C, § 39.  
The Board therefore issued a decision for the Appellant and 
granted an abatement in the amount of $19,938,368, plus 
statutory additions, and ordered said amount to be refunded. 
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